This article explains variation in the quality of representation in the context of European Parliament elections. Specifically, it clarifies how voters relate to political parties on the issue of European integration and whether they are represented, misrepresented or indifferent to this issue. The analysis shows that perceived benefits of European integration do drive a perfect voter-party match while perceived costs, when high, drive a perfect match between Eurosceptic voters and likeminded parties and make voters less indifferent. The analysis draws attention to the high number of status-quo voters who, in the absence of a party with similar views, could channel their vote towards a party promoting integration, but only if their knowledge about the EU and its benefits increases.
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the representation of individual voters on the issue of European integration. Why do some people vote for a party that represents their views while others chose to vote for a party that does not? Furthermore, can individual benefits received from the EU explain the difference between perfect and imperfect substantive representation on this issue?
Of interest to this paper is the common benchmark to most forms of representation, which is the criterion of constituent-representative congruence. The similarity between voters' preferences and representatives' future actions is evident first and foremost in promissory representation, when electoral promises reflect the congruence between constituent and representative, but the norm of congruence applies to all forms of representation (Mansbridge 2003) . Recent debates on representation focus on various forms of representing the citizenry (promissory, anticipatory, surrogate, gyroscopic representation), forms which are not completely distinct, but which may become interchangeable over time (Mansbridge 2003) . A similar idea appears in other normative outlooks of representation (Saward 2014: 726) whereby the shape-shifting representatives deploy 'shifting shades and aspects of a range of representative roles […] moving in and among a range of familiar roles', from trustee and delegate to politico or informal representative in the form of advocates.
The analysis provided in this paper offers an empirical account of the level of congruence as it occurs at the time of voting, without considering any post-election action from the representatives. The framework provides individual explanations for why different levels of congruence exist. Especially in the context of European Parliament elections which use proportional representation, the party is considered to be representative of the voter's preferences as in the responsible party government model (Budge et al 2012 , Dalton et al 2011 .
This article complements previous research on issue representation (Dalton 2015 , Costello et al. 2012 ) by adopting a different perspective centred on the voters. Whilst in most frameworks of representation the focus is on the actions and preferences of the representative, this paper places the emphasis on the input element of representation -the voter, who is ultimately the generator of the representational process.
Before taking a decision about their preferred party, voters evaluate how well parties mirror their opinions. Voters do not think in aggregate terms and this justifies even more an individual approach to representation.
The contribution of this article is twofold. Firstly, in order to explain the quality of substantive representation, the research tests explanations at the level of the principals (voters) and of the agent (parties) across EU member states. The analysis emphasizes the role of benefits and costs from integration -both individual and systemic. Secondly, by making use of different datasets on parties and voters, the analysis can more accurately match voters' opinions on EU integration (EES 2009 ) with the policy position of the exact parties they have voted for (Profiler 2009 ). As at the time this article was written the elite data was not yet publicly available for the 2014 elections, the matching of preferences was completed using the European Election Study and EU Profiler 2009 data across 27 EU countries. The first section sets out the conceptual framework, while the subsequent parts test several hypotheses advanced using a cost benefit model. The last sections present the results and discuss the implications for further research.
IMPERFECT REPRESENTATION: CONCEPTS AND THEORY
Substantive representation is an important part in the process of delegation and accountability, a process with voters as principals and their agents who can be either members of parliament (MPs), political parties or governments and their policies. Theories of substantive representation postulate that governments and legislatures are supposed to mirror the preferences of their citizens (Dahl 1956 , Pitkin 1967 . Conversely, citizens are expected to vote for parties whose policy positions best represent their preferences. However, representation is never perfect, and what we find in practice is a match or mismatch between parties and voter's preferences. It is the aim of this article to test various explanations for different degrees of representation across Europe.
This degree of match/mismatch matters for the quality of national governance and representative democracy. Explaining the quality of representation on EU integration is relevant because of a high mismatch between the opinions of voters and the opinions of MEPs Franklin 1991, 2004; Mattila and Raunio 2006) . Additionally, EU integration as a political issue is currently relevant for the future of the EU. The voter-party policy congruence is far weaker on EU integration issues than on the Left-Right dimension (Mattila and Raunio 2006, Schmitt and this allows an analysis which can disentangle various individual explanations.
The aim is to explain substantive individual representation, that is, the level of policy congruence between the voter and the actual party for which each voter has cast a ballot. This policy based relationship (Huber and Powell 1994 , Powell 2000 , Powell and Vanberg 2000 , Blais and Bodet 2006 , Budge and McDonald 2007 , Golder and Stramsky 2010 between voters and parties is important as it is claimed to be the essence of democratic representation (Katz 1980) . The smaller the distance between the representatives and the ideological position of voters, the higher the congruence and hence the higher the level of substantive representation. Previous scholarship has focused mostly on the impact of institutions such as the electoral system or on the difference between consensus and majoritarian systems when explaining representation (Powell 2009 ). Systems using proportional representation and consensus institutions are usually associated with a higher level of congruence at the level of parliamentary parties (Golder and Loyd 2012; Golder and Stramski 2000) . The electoral institutions are nevertheless less relevant in the context of European Parliament elections as most countries use proportional representation for these electoral contests.
In contrast to previous institutionally based arguments, this article provides a cost-benefit framework which explains why individuals differ in their representation within and across countries of the EU. A cost-benefit approach to representation fits the policy chosen for investigation -European integration -as this issue is relevant considering the financial crisis followed by the current immigration crisis that the EU is facing. After the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, European integration has started to receive higher importance from both parties and voters. Equally, as enlargement and integration progressed, immigration has become a significant dimension of party competition in European Parliament elections Rose 2010, Barbulescu 2009 ). An additional reason for choosing this issue is the large elite-mass gap (Mattila and Raunio 2006 In order to maximize representation, issue voting on European integration is a function of voters' perception of the entire process of integration. The benefits and costs received from the EU following membership can play a role when voters decide to cast a vote for a party with a similar or a dissimilar position. The argument of this paper is that on the issue of European integration, voters maximize their representation based on their perceived individual and systemic utility associated with EU membership, utility which is mediated by issue salience. As representation is never perfect, explaining its extent requires an analysis in a multilevel setting. The overall policy position match is a function of individual characteristics and systemic features. In what follows, both types of utilities will be discussed in relation to substantive representation.
SYSTEMIC BENEFITS
The gains or losses associated with EU membership may influence voters to choose a party which has a similar position on EU integration. These gains or benefits can be perceived from an individual or systemic perspective. With regards to the latter, we expect a divide between new and old EU member states. 
INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS
Individual voters across all member states may notice long term improvements in their communities, sometimes due to an increased receipt in EU funding, other times simply by being able to enjoy the benefits of a free market or freedom of movement. More informed and educated voters who follow the news regularly may notice systemic improvements in the economic situation. Individual benefits cannot however be entirely classified as economic (McLaren, 2002) . Benefits from EU integration may be associated with various geopolitical, strategic and social cultural improvements to voters' lives. EU membership and integration may be perceived as a good thing from a market perspective but also because integration overall can be interpreted as a return to the big European family in the case of new member states. Positive returns can also be pinned down to voters' satisfaction that the EU institutions are taking decisions in favour of or in line with the position of their own country in Brussels.
This perceived benefit gives voters a sense of efficacy, whereby each voter considers that their vote and opinions count (Finkel 1985) . The satisfaction acquired is mainly related to the external or system responsiveness dimension of efficacy. Furthermore, being represented by politicians who share the same opinion makes voters think they have contributed to the decision making process and that parties and MEPs care about their opinions.
However, following the financial crisis, a large proportion of voters who consider EU integration a good thing, do not want further European integration (Rose and Borz 2015) and choose the status-quo, which may explain different levels of representation attained on this issue. Satisfaction with the European Union and with the way several policies are handled from Brussels may make voters choose a party with a similar position to their own on European integration.
H2:
The higher the individual perceived benefits, the higher the quality of representation by parties promoting integration.
Issue Salience -The Mediation Factor
The impact of costs and benefits on representation can be better understood if we know whether integration is a significant issue for voters. It is important to ascertain whether a low quality representation is indeed related to the lack of interest in the European Parliament elections, the EU as a whole (as posited by second order theories-- Reif and Schmitt 1980; Hix and Marsh 2007; van der Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007) Franklin, 2004) , hence the issue may be dormant in certain party systems. The other option is a system with all parties sharing similar positions on integration, leaving voters with no political alternatives to match their preferences. The vast majority of parties in the new EU 12, which had to negotiate several reforms with the EU, are, with a few recent exceptions (in Hungary and Poland), mostly pro-integration (Borz and Rose 2010) . In a multidimensional political space, where parties compete over several issues such as welfare, immigration, taxation, and morality policies, the salience attributed to EU integration by parties is expected to count for the quality of representation. Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested is:
H3: EU salience -The higher the EU salience for voters and parties, the more likely the match between voter and party preferences on EU integration.

COSTS
In a similar vein with the benefits, the costs of integration can be economic (income or job insecurity), cultural (fear/thereat from other cultures) or political (decline of state sovereignty, EU democratic deficit). The creation of a new level of governance, such as European Union has led to 'a more complex cross-cutting network of governance based upon the breakdown between domestic and foreign affairs, on mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs, and on increasing mutual transparency' (Wallace, 1999, 519) . European integration means also that international actors get involved in national politics, constitutional independence diminishes, and sovereign equality and market competition are transformed.
Especially in old member states, membership came with an increased level of immigration from the EU, which puts an additional strain on national states. It has been emphasized that anti-immigration attitudes are a key factor for understanding resistance to integration ( Related to the threat of immigration is the evident economic argument that the open liberalized market would make those with high income benefit and those with low income lose (Gabel 1998) as immigrants would first take over the low skilled jobs in the host country. What one has to consider is also the increased immigration from outside the EU which puts an additional strain on national governments. All these arguments can be brought forward as explanations for an increased mismatch between parties and voters on EU integration.
Henceforth, if this cost of membership outweighs the benefits, it is to be expected that the level of representation will increase, mainly for those Eurosceptic voters who have the option of being represented by a party with similar views. Consequently, the hypothesis to be tested in relation to costs is as follows: 
Representation
The dependent variable in this study measures the quality of representation across voters and across countries. Based on party/voter match of opinions, representation is measured and conceptualized in three categories. When we have a match --in other words, individuals vote for the party which has the same policy position --then we consider this as perfect representation. This perfect match can go in both directions: for or against integration. In case of a mismatch between voters' and parties preferences, we count this as The EU Profiler study covers data on 156 parties with seats in the European Parliament after the 2009 elections. Their data on party positions was gathered following a triangulation process: from party manifestos, party experts and also from parties who were asked to position themselves on 28 issue dimensions. The issue of EU integration was derived by conducting factor analysis on the EU profiler data (Borz and Rose 2010: 8) . The factor includes questions related to: EU integration being a good thing, being better off as a EU member state, the need to strengthen the European Parliament, the EU foreign policy and the relationship with Russia, the EU security and defence policy, the necessity of national referendums on EU issues and the reduction of national vetoes in EU decision making. The original profiler coding scored parties' position on a 5 point scale from -2 (completely disagree) to +2 (completely agree). For this analysis, the EU integration dimension was subsequently re-coded on a scale from -1 to +1 to reflect anti-integration, neutral and pro- opinion? Repondents were asked to place themselves from a scale from 0 (unification has gone too far) to 10 (unification should be pushed further), which was subsequently recoded into three categories as in the case of parties, to reflect voters pro, neutral and gainst integration. Respondents placing themselves at points 6 to 10 are classified as for more integration; at 0 to 4, in favour of less; and at point 5 or no opinion, as neutral. Only the actual voters from this study were identified together with the party they voted for. Parties' position on EU integration was subsequently coordinated with the position of their voters in order to arrive at our variable with three categories of representation.
Independent variables: context
The financial benefits are calculated in Euro/cap following the budget data released by the Length of membership is coded through a dummy variable which separates the new EU 12 member states from the older member states.
Independent variables: individuals
The The empirical analysis of this paper proceeds in three stages. First, an overview of the quality of representation is presented across all EU member states. Second, the analysis focuses on the direct effect of individual and contextual benefits and costs of integration on the quality of representation. Both country and individual characteristics are included in a multinomial model that considers both individual and country level variables (Table 1 ). The hypotheses are tested by estimating a multinomial model which is justified by the three distinct categories of the dependent variable (Gelman and Hill 2007; Rabe-Hescketh and Skrondal 2012) . In the third stage, the pro and anti-integration voters are divided into two samples and the same analysis is repeated, in order to better disentangle the direction and effect of integration benefits and costs on representation (Table 3 ). The descriptive statistics for all independent variables are provided in the Appendix Table 1 .
IMPERFECT REPRESENTATION ACROSS COUNTRIES
The opinions of principals (voters) and agents (MEPs) on EU integration vary greatly across countries (see Figure 1 ). On average, 49 percent of voters are represented on this issue, followed by 30 percent who are completely misrepresented and 21 percent who are indifferent. Based on our three categories, the empirical distribution of this 'imperfect' representation across Europe is detailed in the Appendix (Table 1) for each country.
[ of voters who prefer things to stay as they were was much larger.
THE IMPACT OF COSTS AND BENEFITS ON THE QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
The results show support for the claim that perceived benefits playing a role in voters' decision, whether or not to vote for a party which has the same stance on EU integration. The perceived costs also are not negligible, especially for those voters who think of immigration as being a relevant threat.
The analysis reported in Table 1 presents the results of a multinomial logit model which considers the dependent variable with three distinct categories of representation:
'represented', 'indifferent' and 'misrepresented' voters. The analysis treats the represented group as the reference category. The novelty of these data allows for a clear differentiation between the three categories of representation and permits testing the strength of various explanations for belonging to each distinct category. The odds ratios (as reported in Table 1) which take values above 1 show a positive impact. Values below 1 show a negative impact of each independent variable on the probability of falling in each representation group.
[ Table 1 . Explaining imperfect representation through costs and benefits about here]
Financial benefits
Financial benefits per capita calculated from the EU budget per each country do not have the expected directional influence. Contrary to our expectations, the more financial benefits a country receives from the EU, the more the voters from these countries are likely to be misrepresented. Additionally, with every unit increase in benefits from the EU, the odds of falling in the indifferent category are 37 percent higher than the odds of falling in the represented category (odds ratio 1.37, Table 1 ). This negative relationship might be related to the lack of information voters have on this matter.
Access to relevant information about the EU is important in shaping people's preferences about European integration and in choosing their party accordingly. The influence of information on preferences also depends on the level of attention citizens are willing to give to it (Druckman and Lupia 2016) . However, whether voters watch the election news on TV, or whether they follow news regularly, does not have an effect on the quality of issue representation on EU integration (Table 1) . The effect clarifies when we differentiate between the pro and anti EU groups of voters (Table 3) .
Unfortunately, the EES 2009 survey does not provide us with a question which could control
for voters' awareness of their country's contribution to or benefit from the EU budget or about awareness of their country's absorption of EU funds. Instead of testing the actual voter knowledge about financial benefits, the analysis controls for information by using a proxy measure on the general knowledge about EU, and as reported, the above mentioned relationship between representation and financial benefits maintains. In fact, minimal knowledge about the EU is likely to make a voter more misrepresented than represented on EU integration. Gabel's (1998) arguments, our results also show that with every unit increase in the perceived standard of living increases across Europe, the probability of voters being misrepresented and indifferent reduces by 9 and 8 percent respectively (odds ratios 0.91, 0.92, Table 1 ).
[ Table 2 . Europe.
The individual perception of costs and benefits
Individual evaluation of benefits impacts the attainment of representation in the expected
direction. An individual's positive evaluation and perception of EU's policy influence on his country leads him to cast a vote for a party which shares his opinion. As the results in Table 1 show, the more individuals are satisfied with the way EU works, the lower the probability of falling in the misrepresented or indifferent category. For example, with one unit increase in the EU satisfaction of voters, the expected probability of being indifferent (rather than represented) decreases by 19 percent and the probability of being misrepresented falls even more, by 33 percent (Table 1 , odds ratios 0.81, 0.67) . Similarly, the more voters think that an increased number of national policies are being influenced by EU decisions, the higher the quality of representation. Voters who trust the EU and think that EU membership is a good thing largely tend to be represented by pro integration parties (see Table 3 , model 1). attained level of representation, the systemic EU salience -that is, the importance that parties attribute to EU integration -does not impact on the attained level of voter representation.
This analysis points to the fact that a large number of voters for pro and anti-integration parties are in favour of maintaining the status-quo and do not want further integration. Even if they follow the news regularly, they still consent to be represented by an anti-integration party. When status-quo voters choose an anti-integration party (Table 3, Table 1 ) than to be represented. The reason behind their choice rests on the knowledge held about the EU in general (odds ratio 1.14), which could ultimately influence them to choose a pro-integration party rather than the opposite. The vote choice for a pro-integration party is further analysed in the next section.
What differentiates representation by pro-and anti-integration parties?
The analysis of costs and benefits is better reflected when the analysis of representation is conducted separately on samples with voters for pro-integration parties and the same is repeated for voters of anti-integration parties (see Table 3 ).
[ Table 3 . Representation by pro and anti-integration parties about here]
The analysis reported in Table 3 is the result of two separate multinomial logit models for representation by pro-and anti-integration parties. The number of voters and countries for both models are reduced as anti-integration parties operate only in 16 EU countries 5 in 2009.
At the individual level, the results demonstrate the robustness of previous findings reported in Table 1 . With this analysis, we are better able to explain representation in both directions.
EU satisfaction works in the expected direction and has a stronger effect in the group of voters for pro-integration parties. The more satisfied with the EU, the higher the probability to vote and be represented by a pro-integration party and also the lower the likelihood to favour the status-quo and vote for a party promoting integration (model 1, Table 3 ).
Additionally, the higher the perceived costs of integration -both in terms of immigration and political implications for member states-the greater the probability of being represented by a party opposing integration (model 2, Table 3 ). Perceived costs in the form of threat from immigration and EU decisions taken against the interest of member states are the strongest explanations for why voters chose representation by a Eurosceptic party. In 2009, a majority of EU citizens expressed no confidence that EU decisions are in the interest of their own country.
When the perceived costs of integration are high, the probability of being represented by a party opposing integration increases. The results in Table 3 , model 2, point towards perceived costs having the effect of reducing the probability of falling into the indifferent category by an average of 15 percent. The reverse situation however has a higher probability. Indifferent voters who prefer the status-quo may also end up voting for pro-integration parties (Table 3, model 1). Perceived high costs makes them choose a party promoting further integration, most probably because in this case, they have some knowledge about the functioning of the EU (odds ratio 1.18), which does not make a significant difference when they chose a Eurosceptic party. Additionally, the results show that, alongside having some knowledge about the EU, status-quo voters who watch election related news on TV are more likely to vote for a pro-integration party (model 1, Table 3 ). Overall, voters in the indifferent category are highly educated but do not have a clear interest in politics or a clear left or right political orientation (Table 1) . They can nevertheless be mobilized by the visual media (Table 3 model 1) and subsequently influenced to choose a pro-integration party.
Citizens who prefer the status-quo and vote for an anti-integration party follow news regularly from various other sources (model 2, Table 3 ). This draws attention to the importance of the media tone and content. TV news seem to drive the pro-EU representation while diverse news content fuels status-quo votes for the Eurosceptic parties.
Misrepresentation by parties against EU integration increases significantly in party systems where competition is carried out on more than three dimensions. This is clearly an indication that other dimensions such as taxes, welfare, morality policies or environment carry heavier weight in the eyes of the voters. In those situations, voters may choose to get informed and be represented on other dimensions which they deem to be more important.
Another significant detail which transpires when the analysis is repeated this way is that voters in the new EU12 are significantly less likely to be misrepresented or indifferent when they vote for a party for integration. Perceived benefits are an important explanation for high quality representation when voters choose a pro-EU party. Against initial expectations, actual benefits from the EU budget do not impact on the quality of representation by pro-integration parties. These benefits, however, seem to be de facto very high in systems where voters are 4.4 times more likely to be misrepresented and 4.6 time more likely to allow an indifferent representation by anti-EU parties (Table 3 , model 2).
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This article applied a novel approach to the concept of representation and has matched actual Overall, the impact of costs and benefits from integration is highly relevant for all three categories of representation. As for the mediation factor -EU salience-as expected, representation by parties promoting integration increases when EU is salient for voters and especially when voters think of themselves as Europeans. Whether the EU is salient or not for parties does not make any difference to the quality of representation. Representation can be attained even when the EU is not the most important issue addressed by parties in their programmes and campaigns. Similarly, misrepresentation can occur when the EU is salient for parties. Specifically, even when EU integration is a highly debated topic across a party system, it is the importance of other issues, cumulated with a high number of dimensions of competition, which may influence a pro-integration voter to choose an anti-integration party. 
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